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Repeated exposures to an object will lead to an enhancement of evaluation toward that object. Although
this mere exposure effect may occur when the objects are presented subliminally, the role of conscious
perception per se on evaluation has never been examined. Here we use a binocular rivalry paradigm to
investigate whether a variance in conscious perceptual duration of faces has an effect on their subsequent
evaluation, and how selective attention and memory interact with this effect. Our results show that face
evaluation is positively biased by selective attention but not affected by visual awareness. Furthermore,
this effect is not due to participants recalling which face had been attended to.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Attention and emotion interact closely and both affect human
behaviors (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Vuilleumier, 2005). It
is well known that emotionally salient stimuli attract selective
attention (Finucane, 2011; Ito et al., 1998; Schupp et al., 2003;
Yiend, 2010). Conversely, selective attention also inﬂuences affec-
tive response processing (Fenske & Raymond, 2006). For example,
in a visual search task, it has been shown that distractors are eval-
uated less favorably than targets (Fenske et al., 2005; Raymond,
Fenske, & Tavassoli, 2003; Raymond, Fenske, & Westoby, 2005).
Variance in visual perception is another factor that modulates
emotion and evaluation. For instance, repeated exposures to an ob-
ject will lead to an enhancement of evaluation toward that object;
this is known as the ‘‘mere exposure effect (MEE)’’ (Bornstein,
1989; Zajonc, 1968, 1980). This effect is still demonstrable even
without conscious perception of a stimulus (i.e., with subliminal
priming), indicating that conscious perception of the stimuli is
not necessary for the MEE (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). However,
whether variance of conscious perception per se has an effect on
affective responses has not been examined. In previous studies
duration of conscious perception was either completely removed
(i.e., unconscious) or set to be the same length as the duration of
stimulus exposure. It is not clear whether variation of consciousperception can inﬂuence evaluation when duration of stimulus
exposure is controlled.
In addition, it is not clear how conscious perception interacts
with selective attention to modulate affective responses. Although
it has been shown that attended stimuli are evaluated better while
ignored ones are unaffected (Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009), this
ﬁnding is in conﬂict with the distractor devaluation effect (Fenske
& Raymond, 2006). Also, it is arguable that attended stimuli are
positively evaluated merely because they can be better memo-
rized/recognized (Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009).
We examined these questions with the binocular rivalry (BR)
paradigm. During BR, each eye views a different stimulus over a
period of time and conscious perception alternates between the
two stimuli (Blake, 2001; Fox, 1991; Howard & Rogers, 1995; Le-
velt, 1965; Walker, 1978; Wheatstone, 1838). BR provides an effec-
tive tool for studying the role of consciousness because a visual
image can be suppressed from consciousness while remaining
physically present. Thus, behavioral consequences should only re-
ﬂect the ﬂuctuating conscious contents (and/or the mechanisms
associated with interocular suppression), unconfounded by the
bottom-up exposure of stimuli.
In our experiment, participants ﬁrst performed a binocular riv-
alry task. In each trial, they viewed a pair of faces through a stereo-
scope and had to indicate their conscious percepts. After the
binocular rivalry task, participants performed an unexpected eval-
uation task which they had to rate whether the novel faces and
faces seen in the binocular rivalry task were trustworthy. In addi-
tion, they also had to perform an unexpected memory task, during
which they had to determine if they had attended to the faces pre-
viously. If conscious perception contributes to the subsequent
Table 1
The denotation used in the paired comparison in the attending task.
Denotation Selective attention
(+): attended
Selective attention
(): not attended
Conscious perception (+):
dominant
AD ND
Conscious perception ():
suppressed
AS NS
1 The mean perceived duration of the dominant faces is longer than that of the
suppressed faces: 19.91 seconds vs. 2.81 s in the free rivalry condition, and 20.73 s vs
2.50 s in the attending condition (both p < 0.01). Mixed percepts took up the
remaining time. No signiﬁcant difference was found between the free rivalry and the
attending conditions in the mean perceived duration of dominant, suppressed, and
mixed percepts (all p > 0.253).
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duration of the faces in the binocular rivalry task would affect their
subsequent evaluations. To manipulate selective attention in the
binocular rivalry task, in another block, participants were in-
structed to attend to one of the faces so that the effects of selective
attention and conscious perception could be examined simulta-
neously (Table 1).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Twenty-seven adult volunteers (12 males and 15 females, mean
age = 23.4 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
participated in the experiment. All subjects received informed con-
sent within a protocol approved by the Duke-NUS Graduate Med-
ical School and were paid 12SGD for a session lasting
approximately 45 min.
2.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli were 105 grayscale faces acquired from NimStim (Tot-
tenham et al., 2009) and the face database used in Kanwisher,
McDermott, and Chun (1997). Faces were young adults mixed of
gender (58 males and 47 females) and race (Caucasian: 47, Asian:
20, African: 10, Hispanics: 5, Indians: 3), and all with smiling
expression, visible hair, and eyes gazing directly ahead.
Visual stimulator was a Dell PC running Windows XP. The faces
were presented on a white background and displayed with E-Prime
v1.2 on a 17-in LCD ViewSonic monitor with a resolution of
800  600 pixels and a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The viewing distance
was 45 cm. All alphanumeric stimuli and instructions were pre-
sented in black 18-point Courier New font.
2.3. Procedure and design
Prior to the main experiment, subjects completed dynamic psy-
chophysical testing with a staircase procedure to determine the
contrast values of the stimuli in the left and right eyes so that
the stimuli could be perceived with equal frequency. Speciﬁcally,
we presented two faces in each trial, one in each eye, and the sub-
jects had to indicate which face was perceived. We decreased the
contrast of one of the faces if that face was perceived in the previ-
ous trial, and increased its contrast when the other face was per-
ceived. The staircase procedure contained 48 trials, and the ratio
of the ﬁnal contrast of the two stimuli was used in the main exper-
iment (only in the binocular rivalry task but not in the evaluation
task). The contrast adjustment was based on histogram equaliza-
tion and the limit of contrast increment was set to 50% to 50%
of the original contrast so that faces would not look too dimmed
or sharp.
The stimulus conﬁguration and experimental procedures are
shown in Fig. 1. Participants ﬁrst performed a binocular rivalry task
consisting of a free rivalry block and an attending block. Each block
consisted of 20 trials (40 faces). In each trial, a pair of faces was dis-
played separately to the left and right eye and were fused whenseen through a stereoscope composed of four front-surfaced mir-
rors (Optosigma, CA, University of Houston College of Optometry,
TX) mounted on a chin rest. The order of the two blocks was ran-
domized and counterbalanced across subjects.
In the free rivalry block, a central ﬁxation cross (0.7  0.7) and
a frame (4.2  4.7) was always present in both eyes (Fig. 1A). At
the beginning of each trial, a blank screen was displayed for 1 s.
Then a pair of faces (left: Face A, right: Face B, centered at 2.6 to
left and right of ﬁxation; face size: 4.1  4.5), one in each eye,
was presented for 4 s, during which participants were asked to
memorize the identity of both face A and face B (Memorization
Phase). After that, face A was presented to the left eye and face B
to the right eye for 30 s (frame size: 4.2  4.7, face size:
4.1  4.5, centered on the ﬁxation), during which participants
were required to report the dominant percept by pressing and
holding one of two buttons corresponding to the two faces (Rivalry
Phase). No response was required for mixed percepts.
In the attending block, the stimulus conﬁguration and proce-
dure were identical to those in the free rivalry block, except that
during the 4-s memorization phase, an asterisk (0.7  0.7) was
randomly displayed beneath one of the faces (counterbalanced).
Participants were instructed to attend to the marked face in the
subsequent 30-s rivalry phase.
After the binocular rivalry task, the stereoscope was removed
and participants were told to perform an unexpected evaluation
task (Fig. 1B). Each trial began with a blank screen (500 ms), fol-
lowed by a face presented for 350 ms (frame size: 4.2  4.7, face
size: 4.1  4.5). This to-be-evaluated face was either a novel face
or a face that had been previously presented in the binocular riv-
alry task. Participants then answered two questions at their own
pace: ﬁrst, ‘‘how trustworthy do you think this face is’’, and second,
‘‘have you attended to this face in the previous task’’. Participants
were told that the attended face referred to the marked face in
the attending block. Participants made a binary choice by pressing
1 for faces evaluated as trustworthy and 5 for not trustworthy, and
pressing Y or N for attended and non-attended faces. There were
105 trials in the evaluation task. For each participant, 80 out of
the total 105 faces (randomly assigned) were used in both the bin-
ocular rivalry task and evaluated in the evaluation task, and the
other 25 faces served as novel faces only in the evaluation task.3. Results
We ﬁrst tested whether exposed faces were evaluated more
positively or negatively than the novel ones. We calculated partic-
ipants’ proportion of trustworthiness responses to quantify their
evaluations. A paired t-test was conducted to compare evaluations
between novel faces and those from the attending or the free riv-
alry task. The results showed that previously exposed faces were
more positively evaluated (see Table 2). This effect was signiﬁcant
between novel faces and those in the attending task (t(26) = 2.293,
p = 0.030), and was marginally signiﬁcant between novel faces and
those in the free rivalry task (t(26) = 1.875, p = 0.072). In addition,
attended faces in the attending task were evaluated more posi-
tively than the novel faces (t(26) = 2.572, p = 0.016). In contrast,
non-attended faces in the attending task were not evaluated differ-
ently from the novel faces (t(26) = 1.226, p = 0.231).
We then examined whether a variance in conscious perception
of the faces had an effect on subsequent evaluation.1 Results.
Fig. 1. (A) An example of the stimuli used in the binocular rivalry task. (B) An example of the trial sequence used in the evaluation task.
Table 2
The average proportion of trustworthiness choice of novel faces (Novel) and faces presented in the free rivalry task and attending task. Faces in the attending task are further
divided into attended faces (attended) and unattended faces (unattended). Paired t-test results against novel faces are also shown (*p < 0.05).
Mean (%) Std. err. (%) Difference with Novel condition (%) t p-Value (2-tailed)
Novel 63.26 4.03
Free rivalry task 68.06 3.86 4.80 1.875 0.072
Attending task overall 68.61 3.57 5.35 2.293 0.030*
Attended 71.18 3.59 7.92 2.572 0.016*
Unattended 66.10 4.04 2.84 1.226 0.231
(df = 26)
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faces in the free rivalry condition were not signiﬁcantly different
(mean difference = 2.58%, t = 1.083, p = 0.289), suggesting that
the conscious perceptual duration of the faces did not affect
evaluation.
To examine the effect of both selective attention and conscious
perception on evaluation in the attending condition, we performed
a repeated-measures ANOVA to compare proportion of trustwor-
thiness choice with two factors: Conscious Perception (dominant
vs. suppressed faces) and Attention (attended vs. non-attended
faces). A signiﬁcant main effect on Attention was detected(F(1,26) = 5.326, p = 0.029), suggesting that attended faces were
better evaluated than the non-attended faces (Fig. 2). The evalua-
tions of trustworthiness did not differ between the Conscious Per-
ception groups (F(1,26) = 1.728, p = 0.200), replicating the null
effect of conscious perception in the free rivalry condition. No
interaction effect was found (F(1,26) = 1.364, p = 0.253).
To further understand the effect of selective attention on evalu-
ation, we conducted a paired comparison based on the trial types.
In the current experiment, there were two possible stimulus pairs
in the attending task (see Table 1). The ﬁrst type (AD–NS pair) oc-
curred when a face in a given trial was attended (A) and that face
Fig. 2. The effects of selective attention and conscious perception on trustworthy
score. The larger the number the more trustworthy the face is; *p < 0.05.
Table 3
Pearson correlation coefﬁcient between duration of conscious perception and
evaluation (proportion of trustworthiness choice) in each condition of the attending
task.
AD NS AS ND Attended Not attended
0.033 0.003 0.234 0.239 0.173 0.200
Attended = AD + AS; not attended = ND + NS.
All p > 0.222; n = 27.
Table 4
One-sample t-test of recognition performance against 50% correctness (chance level)
in the attending task.
Mean correctness
(%)
Std. err.
(%)
t (Against 50%) p-Value
(2-tailed)
Overall 50.88 1.77 0.498 0.623
AD 54.37 3.98 1.100 0.281
NS 50.37 4.39 0.085 0.933
AS 51.99 5.02 0.396 0.696
ND 51.06 4.51 0.236 0.816
(df = 26)
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that same trial was non-attended (N) and more suppressed (S). The
second type (AS–ND pair) occurred when a face in a given trial was
attended but that face turned out to be more suppressed. By deﬁ-
nition, the other face in that same trial was non-attended and more
dominant. The result showed that in the AD–NS pair, the propor-
tion of trustworthiness choice of AD (mean = 73.81%) was signiﬁ-
cantly different than that of the NS (mean = 64.16%, t = 2.363,
p = 0.026). However, in the AS–ND pair, the proportion of trustwor-
thiness choice of AS (mean = 66.99%) was not different from that of
the ND (mean = 64.16%, t = 0.840, p = 0.409). In addition, only AD
faces were signiﬁcantly evaluated better than novel faces
(t(26) = 3.499, p < 0.01) while faces in the NS condition were not
(t(26) = 0.281, p = 0.781). Faces in AS or ND were not evaluated dif-
ferently than novel faces (p > 0.434). In short, the selective atten-
tion effect was evident in the AD–NS pair while not evident in
the AS–ND pair, suggesting that the selective attention had a posi-
tive effect on subsequent evaluation only when the attended stim-
ulus was dominant.
To test the possibility that the attentional effect was not medi-
ated by attention, but actually mediated only through attention-
biased binocular rivalry, we examined whether the conscious per-
ception duration of attended faces is correlated with the subse-
quent evaluations. A correlation analysis showed that conscious
perception duration of attended faces did not signiﬁcantly corre-
late with subsequent evaluations (r = 0.173, p = 0.387). Nor did
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between unattended faces and
their subsequent evaluations (r = 0.200, p = 0.318), suggesting
no inhibition on subsequent evaluations from attention-biased
binocular rivalry. In addition, no signiﬁcant correlation was found
between duration of conscious perception and subsequent evalua-
tions in the AD–NS pair or the AS–ND pair (see Table 3).
One might argue that the attended faces were evaluated more
positively than the non-attended ones because the attended faces
were better memorized (i.e., participants could recall which face
had been attended to). To examine this possibility, we testedwhether participants could correctly distinguish if a face had been
previously attended to in the binocular rivalry task. Results (see
Table 4) showed that their recognition performance of the faces
seen in attending task was not different from chance level (50%
of correctness, mean = 50.88%, t(26) = 0.498, p = 0.623; for the AD,
AS, ND, and NS conditions individually, all p > 0.281). Neither did
we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant difference between AD–NS pair
(t(26) = 0.542, p = 0.592) or AS–ND pair (t(26) = 0.120, p = 0.905).
This ﬁnding suggests that faces were not evaluated more positively
because participants knew these faces had been attended to.4. Discussion
We examined whether visual awareness of a stimulus can mod-
ulate subsequent evaluation. Our results showed that the variance
of conscious perceptual duration of a stimulus (i.e., dominance vs.
suppressed) during binocular rivalry did not affect its rating of
trustworthiness in the subsequent evaluation task. Our ﬁnding is
consistent with the subliminal MEE (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) and
unconscious information processing (Hsieh & Colas, 2012; Hsieh,
Colas, & Kanwisher, 2011; see Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; and Lin
& He, 2009 for review), and suggests that the MEE is mainly driven
by a passive, low-level perceptual ﬂuency of information process-
ing (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Caciop-
po, 2001) without reaching consciousness. However, further
experiments are required to test our interpretation and examine
to what degree this null effect is due to the pre-exposition of faces
during the memorization phase.
In addition, we replicated the MEE and demonstrated that the
exposed stimuli were evaluated more positively than the novel
faces. We also found that the attended stimuli were evaluated
more positively than the non-attended stimuli. However, further
examination revealed that this selective attention effect was only
evident in the AD–NS pairs, but not in the AS–ND pairs. Moreover,
we showed that the attention modulation effect was not due to at-
tended stimuli being better memorized. This ﬁnding of attentional
modulation on the MEE is consistent with the ﬁndings of Yagi, Iko-
ma, and Kikuchi (2009), in which they showed that the MEE is evi-
dent in the attended stimuli while absent in the unattended
stimuli. Our ﬁnding differs in that we further showed that atten-
tion only modulates the MEE when an attended stimulus is percep-
tually dominant during binocular rivalry. Attention does not
modulate a perceptually suppressed stimulus, even though the
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This ﬁnding suggests that attention probably cannot modulate
evaluation when a conﬂict exists between attention and conscious
perception (i.e., when an attended stimulus is not dominant as it
should be). In the free rivalry condition, the faces were not evalu-
ated more positively than the novel faces as expected (t = 1.875
p = 0.072). We suspect that the marginally signiﬁcant effect might
have been due to dominant faces attracting attention automati-
cally and inevitably. Note that this attentional effect could be di-
rectly caused by attention or mediated through attention-biased
binocular rivalry. For example, it has been shown that selective
attention is required for binocular rivalry (Brascamp & Blake,
2012) and can bias conscious perception toward attended stimuli
during rivalry (Mitchell, Stoner, & Reynolds, 2004; Paffen & Alais,
2011). In our study, however, we did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant correla-
tion between duration of perception and evaluation in the attend-
ing task. Therefore, our results do not support the idea that this
attentional effect is merely mediated through attention-biased
binocular rivalry. Nevertheless, further experiments are required
to tease apart these two possibilities.
Note that the absence of a negative trustworthiness rating for
the non-attended stimuli does not necessarily mean that there
was no distractor devaluation effect, because the negative distrac-
tor devaluation effect might have been overwhelmed by the posi-
tive MEE. For example, it was suggested that the MEE and the
devaluation effect may inﬂuence affective responses interactively
(Fragopanagos et al., 2009; Goolsby et al., 2009; Kihara et al.,
2011), possibly in an additive fashion (Fragopanagos et al., 2009;
Goolsby et al., 2009). Therefore, it is possible that there was in fact
a distractor devaluation effect in our study but it was nulliﬁed by
the MEE.
Alternatively, there are other explanations as to why only the
positive effect was evident in our ﬁnding. For example, it is pro-
posed that attention-inhibition effect requires feature selection
(Goolsby et al., 2009; Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009). Speciﬁcally,
in the distractor devaluation literature, a target is typically deﬁned
by a speciﬁc feature (Fenske et al., 2005; Raymond, Fenske, &
Tavassoli, 2003; Raymond, Fenske, & Westoby, 2005). In our study,
attention is directed to the whole identity of the stimuli rather
than on a single feature. It is also possible, as demonstrated by
Yagi, Ikoma, and Kikuchi (2009) that the distractor devaluation ef-
fect requires inputs from the orienting system. That is, the orient-
ing system acts as a source of emotional information that feed-
forwards to the higher-level evaluation system (Shimojo et al.,
2003). In our study, eye movements should not induce any bias dif-
ferentially because the two competing stimuli were superimposed
and both present at the fovea. Still another possibility is that the
duration of our stimuli presentation is much longer (30 s) than in
typical devaluation studies (usually less than one second). This
long duration might allow multiple exposures of the stimuli and
enhance the MEE while weakening the distractor devaluation ef-
fect. Further investigation is required to tease apart these
possibilities.
Our ﬁndings suggest that object-based attention and the mech-
anisms for inter-ocular conﬂict resolution can interact to modulate
stimulus preference. According to the perceptual ﬂuency theory of
the MEE, repeated exposure of a stimulus increases its perpetual
processing ﬂuency, which subsequently generates a positive feel-
ing toward a stimulus (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994; Winkielman
& Cacioppo, 2001). We suspect that perceptual ﬂuency is inversely
related to the strength of competition between neurons represent-
ing distinct stimuli. During binocular rivalry, images compete for
perception, and attention modulates such competition by enhanc-
ing one percept at the expense of the other (Paffen & Alais, 2011;
Paffen, Verstraten, & Vidnyánszky, 2008). Stronger perceptual ﬂu-
ency may result when the more dominant stimulus also receivesan attentional boost. Under such conditions, competition from
the less dominant stimulus is relatively weak as it is further atten-
uated by attentional bias. In contrast, even when the attended ob-
ject is less dominant, it can still provide strong competition against
the unattended dominant stimulus, effectively reducing the per-
ceptual ﬂuency for the latter.
The neural structure underlying the attention-modulated MEE
is still not clear. Although attention can modulate binocular rivalry
at multiple stages of visual processing (Dieter & Tadin, 2011; Paf-
fen & Alais, 2011), we suspect that attention-modulated MEE oc-
curs in higher visual areas. It has been shown that attention-
modulated MEE occurs at the object-level but not at the level of
the components constituting the object (Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi,
2009). This ﬁnding suggests that the processing of low-level image
features is unlikely to be the source of the MEE, consistent with
brain imaging studies showing neural correlates of MEE in ob-
ject-level visual cortical areas such as fusiform gyrus but not in
V1(Elliott & Dolan, 1998; Zebrowitz & Zhang, 2012).
To conclude, our ﬁnding sheds light on the nature of MEE by
showing that this effect can occur with or without consciousness,
but the visual stimulus needs to be an object of attention (Dehaene
et al., 2006; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007). Mere exposure is a process of
acquisition of appropriate preferences (i.e., assignment of emo-
tional meaning to a stimulus) to successfully adapt to local condi-
tions. Such processes may be passive, effortless, and non-selective,
suggesting that the necessity for consciousness is at minimum
(Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000; Seitz,
Kim, & Watanabe, 2009). However, such unselective processing
poses a challenge as the brain is susceptible to environmental
information bombardment to the extent that people may be
unconditionally inﬂuenced by contextual factors in the environ-
ment. Instead, consistent with previous studies that top-down
selection mechanisms guide preference acquisition (Craver-Lemley
& Bornstein, 2006; Yagi, Ikoma, & Kikuchi, 2009), our ﬁndings im-
ply that attentional modulation may play an important role for
mediating unconsciously acquired preferences for future access.References
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